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I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of foreign affairs, the President of the United States
historically has exercised broad discretion in dealing with interna-
tional emergencies and formulating United States foreign policy.' The
source of the Executive's power to conduct foreign affairs is Article II
of the U.S. Constitution.2 Article II vests executive power in the Pres-
ident, 3 empowering him to make treaties with the concurrence of two-
t Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida.
J.D., Wayne State University School of Law (1977); LL.M., Harvard Law School (1982).
1. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrruTION 37 (1972); see, eg.,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (President Carter's power to nullify United
States attachment of Iranian assets held proper as within his foreign affairs power and
under broad grant of authority by Congress).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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thirds of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, and to serve as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 4 In United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co.,5 a unanimous Supreme Court acknowledged the
"plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations .... "6
Although the Constitution may vest the President with "plenary
and exclusive" power in foreign affairs, 7 no such power exists in inter-
national trade. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution explicitly
vests the exclusive power to regulate foreign trade in Congress, not the
President.8 Congress has from time to time delegated discretionary
powers to the President as part of a larger legislative scheme regulat-
ing international trade. The congressional delegation of foreign trade
power to the President, though frequently sweeping in scope, 9 is sub-
ject to the "intelligible principle" test. I0 This test obligates Congress
to specify "an intelligible principle to which the [President] is directed
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
5. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (President's power to prohibit arms sales to foreign countries
upheld as within his foreign affairs powers).
6. Id. at 320.
7. Id. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (The President may act in external affairs without congressional
authorization, but he may not act contrary to an act of Congress). For a strong criticism of
Justice Sutherland's theory of broad presidential power in the Curtiss-Wright, see Berger,
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1972); Levi-
tan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE
L.J. 467 (1946).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. See United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d
560, 571 (C.C.P.A. 1975); R. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
140 (1983) ("The Court has always recognized a plenary power in Congress to deal with
matters touching upon ... foreign trade.") Notwithstanding this textual commitment of
the foreign trade power to Congress, "[ilt is impossible to extricate the question of distribu-
tion of powers over foreign economic affairs from the general problem of distribution of
powers over foreign affairs in United States governmental and constitutional practice." J.
JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
77 (1986). In the area of international economic affairs, Congress holds the trump card of
implementing legislation. Although the Executive Branch may enter into negotiations with
foreign trading partners without congressional authorization, Congress may check the
President's action by refusing to enact enabling and funding legislation. Id. at 78. For a
discussion of the exclusive nature of Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce, see
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1955). The Fourth Circuit noted:
[W]hile the President has certain inherent powers under the Constitution. . the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the powers inci-
dent to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the
Congress.
204 F.2d at 659.
9. See infra notes 13-16.
10. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (congressional dele-
gation of power to the President is not unconstitutional when accompanied by criteria
directing the manner in which the delegated authority is to be exercised).
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to conform."" Failure by Congress to provide an "intelligible princi-
ple" to guide presidential discretion is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to the President.'
2
The focus of this Article is on the legislative wisdom of Congress
in delegating discretionary authority to the President in the interna-
tional trade field. This Article examines three international trade stat-
utes where Congress has delegated trade power to the President:
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930;13 section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974; 14 and section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, commonly known as
"the escape clause."' 5 After an overview of these statutes and Presi-
dential authority under them, 16 the Article examines the practical
application of these statutes and critiques the Congressional delegation
of authority to the President. The Article concludes that Congress's
desire for administrative flexibility has undermined the fundamental
goal of protecting United States domestic industries from unfair and
damaging foreign competition. In addition to the loss of credibility,
the statute's failure to adequately address trade problems has also
resulted in a great deal of disenchantment and cynicism within the
United States exporting, manufacturing, and production sectors. In
the interests of ensuring predictability of results, the Article proposes
11. Id.; see also FEA v. Alongonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976) (citing
Hampton with approval).
12. Hampton, 276 U.S at 409. The delegation doctrine was last used to invalidate an
act of Congress in 1935 in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). For a further discussion of the delegation doctrine, see Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 717 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
16. These three statutes are not exhaustive of the discretionary powers delegated to the
President by Congress in the international trade field. See Generalized System of Prefer-
ences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); section 204 of the
Agricultural Act of 1956, 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Discussion of
these statutes are beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent decision interpreting the
President's power under the Generalized System of Preferences, see Florsheim Shoe Co. v.
United States, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (courts will narrowly review presidential
action taken in conformance with delegated legislative authority), noted in Comment,
Trade Preferences and LDCs: Less Executive Discretion and More Congressional Direction:
Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 903 (1984). For a recent
decision interpreting the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For two recent decisions interpreting
the President's authority under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, see Am. Ass'n
of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no restrictions
will be placed on the President's actions if they are relevant to the enforcement of an
existing textile agreement); Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (Congress's authority to delegate significant portions of its plenary power over inter-
national trade is well established).
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amendments to the statute that would eliminate most, if not all, of the
President's discretionary authority.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. SECTION 337 UNFAIR IMPORT PRACTICES
In the arsenal of laws available to United States manufacturers to
protect them from the ravages of foreign imports, 17 one of the most
potent is section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.18 Section 337(a) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 makes unlawful:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale .... the effect or tendency of which is to
destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically oper-
ated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry
19
The law directs the International Trade Commission (ITC) to
conduct investigations involving alleged unfair import practices20 and
17. Among the statutory protections afforded United States manufacturers by Con-
gress over the years, three of the more widely used laws have been the antidumping duty
law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673g (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the countervailing duty law, id.
§§ 1303, 1671-1671f, and the escape clause, id. §§ 2251-2253. See Syposium: A Practi-
tioner's Guide to International Trade Law, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307-526 (1981);
Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Investigations Under the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1979).
18. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 337, a virtual replication of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), was first
enacted in 1922 when Congress passed the predecessor to section 337, section 316 of the
Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 943 (1922). Section 316 was reenacted with few
changes as section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Later, with the passage of the Trade Act
of 1974, the International Trade Commission (ITC) was for the first time empowered to
determine, subject to Presidential disapproval, whether certain conduct constituted a viola-
tion of section 337. Previously, this power was reserved to the President. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The President, however, may still disapprove an ITC
determination under section 337 "for policy reasons." Id. § 1337(g). See Note, The Revi-
talization of Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 Under the Trade Act of 1974, 11 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 16 (1976).
Section 337 mirrors section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, making illegal
"unfair methods of competition or unfair acts" in the importation of merchandise into the
United States. Despite similar language, the approaches of the ITC and the Federal Trade
Commission in administering their respective statutory mandates have varied considerably.
For a discussion of the different approaches of the two agencies, see Brown, Unfair Meth-
ods of Competition in Importation: The Expanded Role of the U.S. International Trade
Commission Under § 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 31
Bus. LAw. 1627 (1976); Fischbach, The Need to Improve Consistency in the Application and
Interpretation of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65 (1978); La Rue, Section 337 of the 1930
Tariff Act and Its Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart, 43 ANTrTRUsT L.J. 608 (1974).
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
20. Id. Section 337(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 directs the International Trade Com-
mission to conduct an investigation into allegations of a section 337(a) violation. Excluded
from the scope of section 337 are antidumping and countervailing duty cases. Id.
§ 1337(b)(3). See Brandt & Zeitler, Unfair Import Trade Practice Jurisdiction: The Appli-
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authorizes the ITC to exclude offending articles from the United
States.21 Although a section 337 violation typically involves an
imported article that infringes the rights of a United States patent
holder, 22 complaints lodged with the ITC have also alleged trademark
infringement,2 3 false designation of goods,24 the passing off of goods,
2 5
and the misappropriation of trade secrets.
26
There are two elements of a section 337 violation. The petitioner
must prove the existence of (1) unfair methods of competition or
unfair acts that (2) tend to injure or destroy a domestic industry.2 7
Section 337 remedies include temporary exclusion orders,2 8 permanent
exclusion orders,29 and cease and desist orders. 30
cability of Section 337 and the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws, 12 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95 (1980); Kaye & Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade Commission,
2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 3 (1977).
21. If a violation is found to exist, the Commission is authorized to exclude offending
articles from entry into the United States under section 337(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as well as issue cease and desist orders under
section 337(f). Id. § 1337(f).
22. See Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (patent infringement and unauthorized importation of infringing products manufac-
tured abroad are unfair acts or methods under section 337); Merck & Co. v. ITC, 774 F.2d
483 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (ITC should not summarily terminate investigations into allegedly
patent-infringing foreign products); Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 745 F.2d 1 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming ITC's determination that petitioner's patent
rights were not infringed by foreign products); see also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7186.
23. See Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985) (vacuum
bottle trademark); New England Butt Co. v. ITC, 756 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (maypole
braider trademark infringement); Textron, Inc. v. ITC, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(vertical milling machine trademark infringement). See generally Ablondi & Vent, Section
337 Import Investigations-Unfair Import Practices, 4 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27
(1981). For a discussion of the symmetry between section 337 and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, see Fischbach, supra note 18.
24. See, e.g., Trolley Wheel Assemblies, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,165 (1984); Certain Grinding
Machines and the Literature for the Promotion Thereof, 46 Fed. Reg. 7107 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Poultry Cot-Up Machines, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,543 (1984); Pump Top Insu-
lated Containers, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,824 (1979).
26. See, eg., Certain Fluidized Bed Combustion Systems, 50 Fed. Reg. 1136 (1985);
Certain Floppy Disk Drives and Components Thereof, 50 Fed. Reg. 3037 (1985); Certain
Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,041 (1979). For
examples of other unfair trade practices found within the scope of section 337, see Kaye &
Plaia, The Filing and Defending of Section 337 Actions, N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 463
(1981).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of the standards and
scope of section 337 injury, see Brunsvold, Schill & Schwendemann, Injury Standards in
Section 337 Investigations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 75 (1982); see also Ablondi & Vent,
supra note 23; Easton & Neeley, Unfair Competition in U.S. Import Trade: Developments
Since the Trade Act of 1974, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 203, 212-17 (1980); Palmeter, The U.S.
International Trade Commission at Common Law, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497 (1984).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
29. Id. § 1337(d).
30. Id. § 1337(f)(1). For a discussion on the Commission's enforcement of section 337,
see generally Minchew & Webster, Regulating Unfair Practices in International Trade: The
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Proceedings before the ITC follow the procedures used in federal
district court.31 A complaint filed with the ITC commences an inves-
tigation.32 The complaint must satisfy more than the bare notice
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33 All of the
traditional discovery devices are available, 34 as well as protective
orders restricting distribution of confidential business and technical
information.35 An administrative law judge ("AL") presides over
evidentiary hearings. The ALJ allows the presentation of evidence in
much the same manner as a federal district court judge.36 The ALJ
also makes preliminary determinations regarding the existence of the
alleged violation and transmits them to the Commission. The Com-
mission then makes the final determination of whether there has been
a section 337 violation.
37
Should the Commission determine that a section 337 violation
exists, the ITC must forward a copy of its determination to the Presi-
dent,38 who then has sixty days to reject the ITC's affirmative determi-
nation "for policy reasons."' 39 Although the statute nowhere defines
"policy reasons," 4 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
stated that "policy reasons" do not include the merits of the ITC's
determination. 4
1
Finally, to understand section 337's statutory framework, it is
important to recognize that the Commission's 337 determinations are
subject to judicial review,42 but the President's disapprovals are not.
In considering the issue of judicial review of presidential disapprovals
under section 337(g)(2), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC" or "Federal Circuit") in Duracell Inc. v. U.S. International
Role of the United States International Trade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27
(1978); Note, Section 337" An Activist 1TC, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 905 (1982); Note,
Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade Practices Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 234 (1982).
31. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.20-.71 (1985).
32. Id. § 210.20.
33. Id.
34. These discovery devices include depositions, id. § 210.31; interrogatories, id.
§ 210.32; requests for production of documents, id. § 210.33; and requests for admissions,
id. § 210.34. The scope of discovery in section 337 tracks that of Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See 19 C.F.R. § 210.30(b).
35. 19 C.F.R. § 210.30(d).
36. Id. § 210.41(d). Hearings are conducted on the record pursuant to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
38. Id. § 1337(g)(1) (1982).
39. Id. § 1337(g)(2).
40. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 199; H.R. REP. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7367, 7391.
41. Young Eng'rs Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The President
may disapprove only for 'policy reasons,' not because of the merits of an investigation.").
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Trade Commission,4 3 held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a deci-
sion of the President disapproving an ITC unfair trade practice deter-
mination" under section 337(g)(2). 45 As an alternative basis for its
decision, the CAFC ruled that because the President had acted in full
compliance with the provisions of section 337(g)(2), his decision was
immune from further judicial inquiry.46
B. SECTION 301 RETALIATION AGAINST
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
While section 337 provides relief for United States manufacturers
from unfair import practices, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended,4 7 protects United States exporters from foreign import
restrictions that prevent or restrict sales of U.S. products and goods
abroad.48 Under section 302, the President is authorized to take "all
appropriate and feasible action within his power."4 9 Section 301
grants relief for four broad categories of unfair trade practices.50
Trade practices that are (1) "inconsistent with the provisions of, or
otherwise den[y] benefits to the United States under, any trade agree-
ment"; 5 1 (2) "unjustifiable"; 52 (3) "unreasonable"; 53 or (4) "discrimi-
43. 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Duracell is one of only two reported opinions to
consider the issue of judicial review of presidential disapprovals under section 337(g)(2).
The other case is Young Engrs, 721 F.2d 1305.
44. Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1580-81.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This section provides in part:
If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the day on
which he receives a copy of such [ITC] determination, the President, for policy
reasons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disap-
proval, then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action
taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f) of this section [19 U.S.C. § 1337] with
respect thereto shall have no force or effect.
46. Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1581-82.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of the 1979 amendments to
section 301, see Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to For-
eign Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
381, 385-88 (1981).
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985); see also Coffield, supra note 47; Echols, Section
301: Access to Foreign Markets from an Agricultural Perspective, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 4
(1980); Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S.
Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAW & PoL'y INT'L Bus. 569 (1982); Hudec,
Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and
GA 2T Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985).
50. Id.
51. Id. §2411(a)(l)(B)(i).
52. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). The statute defines "unjustifiable" practices as "any act,
policy, or practice which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal
rights of the United States." Id. § 241 1(e)(4)(A). Denial of most-favored-nation treatment
to the United States or failure to protect intellectual property rights are examples of such
practices. Id. § 241 1(e)(4)(B).
53. Id. § 241 1(a)(1)(B)(ii). The statute defines an "unreasonable" practice as one
deemed to be "unfair and inequitable," although not necessarily in violation of the interna-
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natory' '54 are subject to section 301 action. In addition to
demonstrating the existence of one of the four unfair trade practices, a
section 301 petitioner also must show injury. Injury occurs when the
trade practice "burden[s] or restrict[s] United States commerce." 5
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), the President,
or interested persons may initiate a section 301 action. The President
may act on his own motion,5 6 or when requested by a petition initiated
by either the USTR5 7 or an interested person.58 If an individual files a
petition, the USTR has forty-five days in which to review the petition
and decide whether to initiate an investigation. 59 Section 301 does not
provide any standards regulating the USTR's decision to initiate an
investigation. If the USTR decides to initiate an investigation, he
must request consultations with the foreign government involved.6°
However, if the USTR decides not to initiate an investigation, he must
notify the petitioner and publish the decision and summary of reasons
in the Federal Register.
61
Upon completion of the investigation, the USTR must recom-
mend what action, if any, the President should take. The statutorily
prescribed deadline for this recommendation ranges from seven to
twelve months after initiation of the investigation. 62 The President, in
turn, has twenty-one days from receipt of the USTR's recommenda-
tion to determine what action he will take.
63
tional legal rights of the United States. Id. § 2411 (e)(3). Illustrative are practices that
deny fair and equitable market opportunities or opportunities for the establishment of an
enterprise. Id. § 241 1(e)(3)(A)-(B).
54. Id. § 241 1(a)(1)(B)(ii). "Discriminatory" practices include practices that deny
national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services, or investment.
Id. § 241 l(e)(5). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 for the first time expressly provided for
protection of foreign investment. Id. § 241 1(e)(1).
55. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B). The injury standard under section 301 is less stringent than
that provided in sections 337 and 201, both of which contain a substantial injury test.
Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982) (declaring unlawful unfair acts that have "the effect or
tendency... to destroy or substantially injure an industry") and 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1)
(1982) (focusing on imports that are "a substantial cause of serious injury").
56. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
57. Id. §§ 2411(d)(2), 2412(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1985). Regulations governing the proce-
dures for filing and processing section 301 complaints are contained at 15 C.F.R.
§§ 2006.0-.15 (1985). On September 16, 1985, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") self-initiated three section 301 investigations involving Brazilian informatics,
Japanese tobacco, and Korean insurance. See Section 301 Table of Cases, 2 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1414, 1422 (1985).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. III 1985).
59. Id. § 2412(a)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1985).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. III 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5(a) (1985). A request for
consultations may be delayed for up to ninety days for the purpose of verifying the petition.
19 U.S.C. § 2413(b).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3(a) (1985).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
63. Id. § 2411(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
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As part of the investigation, the USTR is required to provide an
opportunity for comment on the matter from the petitioner and other
private sector representatives." Also, the USTR may seek the ITC's
advice65 regarding the probable impact on the economy of retaliatory
restrictions on foreign imports.
66
The President has virtually unfettered discretion in determining
whether to retaliate under section 301. Although the statute directs
the President to "take all appropriate and feasible action" 67 to enforce
United States rights or to eliminate foreign restrictions, he is only
required to do so if he determines that such action is appropriate.
If the President does elect to retaliate against an unfair trade
practice pursuant to section 301, his range of discretion is extremely
broad. The statute authorizes the President to take any "feasible
action,"' 68 including, but not limited to, imposing duties or other
import restrictions; 69 suspending, withdrawing, or preventing the
application of benefits of trade agreement concessions; 70 and restrict-
ing service sector access authorization. 71 No provision grants a right
to judicial review of presidential action under section 301.
C. SECTION 201 ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,72 commonly referred to as
the "escape clause," provides relief to United States industries suffer-
ing or threatened with serious injury substantially caused by increased
imports of competing merchandise. 73 The escape clause is unique
64. Id. § 2414(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
65. In this connection, the USTR must "seek information and advice from the peti-
tioner and appropriate advisory representatives" from the private sector in preparing for
consultations with the foreign government. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. III 1985); 15
C.F.R. § 2006.5.
66. Id. § 2414(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
67. Id. § 2411(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 241 1(b)(2). The President is empowered to take such action either on a non-
discriminatory basis or solely against the foreign government involved. Id. § 2411 (a)(2).
70. Id. § 2411(b)(1).
71. Id. § 2411(c). The access provision was added pursuant to the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984. Id. § 2411(c)-(e). Access to the U.S. service sector, such as telecommunica-
tions, is regulated by the federal government through devices such as licenses. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 307-309 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 248, 98 Stat. 2948, 2998-99 (1984).
73. Id. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The relief available under section 201
includes increased tariffs on the imported articles causing injury, quotas on these articles,
orderly marketing arrangements, or any combination of these actions. Id. § 2253(a)
(1982). The duration of such relief can be for up to five years. Id.
An analogous statute dealing with imports from communist countries is section 406 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982). Section 406 provides similar relief as
section 201 with the exception of trade adjustment assistance. Id. § 2436(a)(3). Relief is
available to an American industry if competing imports from communist countries cause
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because it focuses on fairly traded imports that cause serious injury to
a United States industry. An escape clause petitioner is therefore not
required to show that imports are sold at less than fair market value,74
are subsidized by a foreign government 75 or infringe upon an Ameri-
can patent or trademark holder's rights.
76
The International Trade Commission must make three findings
before recommending relief to the President.77 First, the ITC must
find that imports of competitive merchandise have increased.78 Sec-
ond, it must then determine whether the domestic industry under
examination has been seriously injured or is threatened with serious
injury.79 Finally, the ITC must find that such imports are a substan-
tial cause of that injury or threat.80
Escape clause proceedings are a two-step process. After a peti-
tion is filed with the ITC, the Commission determines whether the
increase in imports of competing merchandise substantially caused
serious injury or the threat of serious injury. 81 If the Commission
makes an affirmative determination, it will then recommend to the
President the relief it believes necessary to remedy the injury.8 2 In
deciding whether to provide relief, the President takes into account
several factors. 83 These factors include: (1) the relief's probable effec-
"market disruption ... with respect to an article produced by a domestic industry." Id.
§ 2436(a)(1); see Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International Trade
Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 745-47 (1976).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. Id. § 1671.
76. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
78. Id. § 2251(b)(1).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case
Study of Section 201 and Its Interpretation by the International Trade Commission, 52 IND.
L.J. 535 (1977); Berg, Petitioning and Responding Under the Escape Clause: One Practi-
tioner's View on How To Do It, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407 (1981); see also Leo-
nard & Foster, supra note 73, at 730-49; Note, An Examination of ITC Determinations on
Imports: The Basis for "'Substantial Injury", 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 242 (1981).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). If the Commission issues a nega-
tive determination, the President has no power to act under section 201. See id. § 2252(a)
(1982) (section 2252 deals exclusively with affinmative findings). The Commission may
recommend increased duties, a tariff rate quota, a quota, trade adjustment assistance, or
any combination of these remedies. Id. § 2251(d) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
83. The statute lists nine factors that the President is to consider in making his deter-
mination of whether to provide escape clause relief:
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the extent to which
workers in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive
adjustment assistance under part 2 of this subehapter or benefits from other man-
power programs;
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on the extent to
which firms in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive
adjustment assistance under parts 3 and 4 of this subchapter;
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tiveness in promoting industry adjustment to import competition;
8 4
(2) the relief's effect on consumers;85 (3) the relief's effect on United
States international economic interests;86 and (4) the economic and
social costs incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers if import
relief were granted. 87 The President has the discretionary power to
reject granting relief altogether if he determines that such relief "is not
in the national economic interest of the United States."
88
The escape clause does not provide for judicial review of either
the ITC's or President's determinations. Nevertheless, the scope of
relief following an affirmative section 201 determination has been chal-
lenged.89 In Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,90 the Federal Cir-
cuit upheld the President's relief determination concluding that it
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote adjustment,
the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to
import competition, and other considerations relative to the position of the indus-
try in the Nation's economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price and availability of
the imported article and the like or directly competitive article produced in the
United States) and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of the
United States;
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a consequence of any
possible modification of duties or other import restrictions which may result from
international obligations with respect to compensation;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the United
States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point for exports of
such article by reason of restraints on exports of such article to, or on imports of
such article into, third country markets; and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers, commu-
nities, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.
Id. § 2252(c) (1982). The list is not exhaustive. See id. (the President is authorized to
consider all relevant considerations).
84. Id. § 2252(c)(3).
85. Id. § 2252(c)(4).
86. Id. § 2252(c)(5).
87. d § 2252(c)(9). The rationale for granting section 201 relief was described in the
Senate Finance Committee Report to the Trade Act of 1974:
The rationale for the "escape clause" has been, and remains, that as barriers to
international trade are lowered, some industries and workers inevitably face seri-
ous injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction. The "escape clause" is
aimed at providing temporary relief for an industry suffering from serious injury,
or the threat thereof, so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the
freer international competition.
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 19.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (1982). President Reagan decided not to grant import
relief to the copper and steel industries following affirmative ITC determinations, conclud-
ing that relief was not in the national economic interest. See Copper Import Relief Deter-
mination, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609 (1984); Steel Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg.
36,813 (1984).
89. See, eg., Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(importer challenged imposition of supplemental duties on its imports by contesting an ITC
determination).
90. Id.
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would be improper for a court to interfere with a section 201 decision
unless the President's action went beyond his delegated authority.
The court observed that "the President's findings of fact and the moti-
vations for his action are not subject to review."91
This Article will now examine the results of the more significant
cases brought under these three statutes. In particular, the analysis
will focus on the role of presidential discretion and how such authority
has frustrated the legislative intent of the statutes.
III. THE EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION-
THE EXPERIENCE
A. SECTION 337
The International Trade Commission has initiated over 200 sec-
tion 337 investigations since enactment of the Trade Act of 1974.92
The President has disapproved the Commission's final affirmative
determination in only four cases. 93 In a recent section 337 decision,
Certain Alkaline Batteries,94 the Commission determined that the
importation of "gray market" alkaline batteries violated section 337.95
The President rejected the Commission's determination, stating that:
The Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act (15
U.S.C. 1124), one of several grounds for the Commission's determination, is at
odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation by the Department of the
91. Id. at 89 (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
92. Ablondi & McCarthy, Impact of the United States International Trade Commission
on Commercial Transactions, 3 DicK. J. INT'L L. 163, 174 (1985). Through January 1986,
239 investigations had been instituted under section 337. See Certain Non-Contact Laser
Precision Dimensional Measuring Devices and Components Thereof, 51 Fed. Reg. 3861
(1986). Paula Stem, chairwoman of the ITC, told a Senate Subcommittee that only three
of the fifty-four contested investigations under section 337 have resulted in a finding of "no
violation" solely because the complainant had failed to carry its burden of showing unfair
methods or injury to a domestic industry. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 275 (1986).
93. See Certain Alkaline Batteries, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,275 (1984). The President's disap-
proval was issued on January 4, 1985, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982), and was
based upon important policy reasons involved in the area of gray market goods. See 50
Fed. Reg. 1,655 (1985). That disapproval was unsuccessfully challenged in Duracell, Inc.
v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disapproval by the President was authorized
because it was explicitly based on policy reasons).
The other three determinations disapproved by the President are Certain Molded-In
Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,485 (1984), see
Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming the modification of
the ITC's determination); Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machinery, 46 Fed. Reg.
32,361 (1981); and Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789
(1978).
94. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,275 (1984).
95. Id. The Commission determined that certain imported alkaline batteries infringed a
registered U.S. trademark and misappropriated the trade dress of the batteries on which the
trademark was used. Id.; see supra note 93 and accompanying text. For a recent decision
discussing the problem of "gray market" goods, see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
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Treasury, which is responsible for administering the provisions of that section.
The Administration has advanced the Treasury Department's interpretation in
a number of pending court cases. Recent decisions of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia and the Court of Interntional Trade explicitly
uphold the Treasury Department's interpretation. Allowing the Commission's
determination in this case to stand could be viewed as an alteration of that
interpretation. I, therefore, have decided to disapprove the Commission's
determination.96
President Reagan concluded that the disapproval was based on policy
concerns:
97
The Departments of Treasury and Commerce, on behalf of the Cabinet Coun-
cil on Commerce and Trade, have solicited data from the public concerning the
issue of parallel market importation and are reviewing responses with a view
toward formulating a cohesive policy in this area. Failure to disapprove the
Commission's determination could be viewed as a change in the current policy
prior to the completion of this process.
9 8
In a court challenge to the President's disapproval, Duracell,
Inc., the U.S. trademark holder, argued that the President's disap-
proval was for "legal," not "policy" reasons, 99 and therefore was con-
trary to statutory authorization.100 The Federal Circuit disagreed
with Duracell and observed that,
"Policy" is a broad concept which includes, but is not limited to: impact on
United States foreign relations, economic and political... [and] upon the pub-
lic health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy,
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
the United States consumers.
10 1
The court concluded that its inquiry must end because the President
acted in a timely fashion, based his decison on policy concerns and not
the merits, and indicated what those non-merit based decisions
were. 102
In an earlier case, Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and
Methods for Their Installation,103 the President disapproved an ITC
determination because of the ITC's proposed remedy. After finding an
unfair trade practice, the Commission issued exclusion and cease and
desist orders stemming from process patent infringement. 104 The
orders directed three domestic purchasers not to use imported prod-
96. Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 (1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982).
101. Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1581-82 (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 1298, supra
note 22).
102. Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1582; see also Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305,
1313 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The President may disapprove only 'for policy reasons,' not
because of the merits of an investigation.").
103. 47 Fed. Reg. 19,485 (1982).
104. Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, 47
Fed. Reg. 29,919 (1982) (presidential disapproval of ITC determination).
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ucts which used a process that infringed a United States process.105
The President rejected the cease and desist orders stating that such an
order "may not be in compliance with U.S. international obliga-
tions." 10 6 The President explained:
The orders may result in less favorable treatment in requirements affecting
purchase and use being accorded imported products than the treatment being
accorded domestic products. . . The discriminatory effect upon imported
products of the three orders directed to the users of those products forms the
basis of my decision to disapprove in this case.
10 7
Recognizing his limited authority, 08 the President had no alter-
native but to disapprove the entire determination. However, the Presi-
dent only objected to the Commission's remedy, not its finding. 10 9
In a section 337 determination reached a year earlier, Certain
Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Con-
tinuous Production of Paper, and Components Thereof,'0 the ITC's
remedy also triggered a presidential disapproval."' In its determina-
tion, the Commission found that multi-ply headboxes of a single for-
eign manufacturer infringed a valid United States patent. 112 The
Commission issued an exclusion order that applied prospectively to
the products of all foreign manufacturers of multi-ply headboxes.' '
In his disapproval, the President concluded that since "[o]nly three or
four multi-ply headboxes are sold each year in the United States...
[t]he need for a broad exclusion order... [was] unnecessary to protect
the patent assignee." ' 14 The President added, however, that an exclu-
sion order directed only at the infringing foreign manufacturer's prod-
ucts would be appropriate. 1 5 He strongly urged the Commission to
redraft its order accordingly, 1 6 which the Commission subsequently
did.
117
The fourth section 337 presidental disapproval came in 1978 in
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Commission subsequently modified its determination in an effort to meet
the President's objections. See 47 Fed. Reg. 42,847 (1982).
108. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,919 (1982) ("The statute does not authorize partial disapprovals or
changes in the remedies."); accord Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
109. Id.
110. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,083 (1981).
111. Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continu-
ous Production of Paper, and Components Thereof, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981) (presiden-
tial disapproval of ITC determination).
112. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,083 (1981).
113. Id.
114. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continu-
ous Production of Paper, and Components Thereof, 46 Fed. Reg. 34,437 (1981).
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Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube.118 In that determina-
tion, the ITC ordered certain manufacturers and importers of Japa-
nese welded stainless steel pipe and tube to cease and desist from
selling such products in the United States at prices below the average
variable cost of production without commercial justification.' 19 Presi-
dent Carter identified four policy considerations for his decision to dis-
approve the Commission's determination:
1. The detrimental effect of the imposition of the remedy on the national
economic interest;
2. The detrimental effect of the imposition of the remedy on the interna-
tional economic relations of the United States;
3. The need to avoid duplication and conflicts in the administration of
the unfair trade practice laws of the United States;
4. The probable lack of any significant benefit to U.S. producers or con-
sumers to counterbalance the above considerations.
120
In his concern over administrative duplication, President Carter
noted that the Treasury Department had already imposed sanctions
on four firms that it determined had violated the antidumping duty
laws. The President reasoned that this government action furnished
adequate protection against the unfair trade practices at issue.121
Moreover, the President contended that the resulting duplication from
overlapping ITC and Treasury determinations would be an irritant in
relations between the United States and Japan. 122 Accordingly, the
President concluded that "the present use of Section 337 where other
remedies are specifically provided for by law and are in fact utilized is
not justified."
123
The Commission's General Counsel sent a letter to the President
two weeks before his Stainless Steel disapproval explaining the ITC's
understanding of the scope of presidental review under section
337(g).124 The General Counsel stated that the policy reasons which
118. Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. No. 863 (1978).
119. See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978)
(presidential disapproval of ITC determination).
Under amendments to section 337 made by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the
Commission probably would have terminated this investigation as it involved allegations of
a violation of the antidumping duty law. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(b)(3), 1673 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 260-61 (1979) ("section 337(b)(3) [is
amended] to require the ITC to terminate an investigation.., when it has reason to believe
that the matter before it is based solely on alleged acts... within the purview of the...
antidumping duty law"). See generally Kaye & Plaia, supra note 20.
120. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789-90 (1978).
121. Id. at 17,790.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 17,791. Section 337 was amended shortly thereafter under the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 to avoid a recurrence of this sort of dual action. See supra note 119.
124. Letter from the General Counsel of the ITC to Chairman, Section 337 Subcommit-
tee, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions (Apr. 7, 1978), noted in Easton & Neeley, supra note 27, at 233.
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could properly form the basis for presidential disapproval were those
factors that section 337 directed the Commission to consider when
framing its orders.' 25 In particular, the General Counsel emphasized
that the possible impact of the Commission's determination on U.S.
foreign relations should be the dominant policy consideration.126
Notwithstanding the views of the ITC's Office of General Coun-
sel, the foregoing cases illustrate that the President retains virtually
unlimited discretion in exercising his power of disapproval under sec-
tion 337(g). The President exercises similarly broad discretion in sec-
tion 301 presidential retaliation cases.
B. SECTION 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ensures that United States
exporters' access to foreign markets is not unfairly, unreasonably, or
discriminatorily restricted or closed to them because of a foreign gov-
ernment's action.127 Section 301 grants the President broad retalia-
tory authority to respond to such unfair foreign trade practices. 128
Between 1975 and 1985, United States companies filed fifty section 301
petitions.129 Before 1985, the self-initiating mechanism had never been
utilized.130 During the period of September to October 1985, however,
the USTR self-initiated five section 301 investigations.' 31 The results
of section 301 actions have been generally mixed.
The USTR rarely declines to initiate a section 301 investiga-
tion,132 but he has terminated ongoing investigations for a variety of
125. Those factors are "the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1982).
126. See supra note 124.
127. See supra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 49-55, 68-71 and accompanying text.
129. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1414-22 (1985) (listing forty-eight section 301 cases filed
through June 14, 1985); see, eg., Roses, Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 40,250 (1985) (determination
not to initiate a section 301 investigation); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 16 (1986) (U.S. spe-
cialty steel producers filed section 301 petition on Dec. 18, 1985, against Swedish specialty
steel industry).
130. See 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1414-22 (1985); see also supra note 58 and accompa-
nying text.
131. These investigations involved Korean restrictions on access to the Korean insur-
ance market; Korean restrictions on Korean intellectual property rights protection; Japa-
nese barriers to exports of U.S. tobacco products; and Brazilian restrictions on foreign
investments, subsidies, and imports. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1422 (1985). In addition,
on Oct. 16, 1985, the President directed the USTR to initiate proceedings against European
Economic Community ("EEC") wheat subsidies. Id.
132. Only once was a determination made not to initiate an investigation. See Roses,
Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 40,250 (1985). In Roses, the petition alleged that several countries had
erected barriers to imports of fresh-cut roses from the United States. Id. The USTR gave
four reasons for not initiating an investigation:
(1) Several of the alleged unfair practices named in the petition had been termi-
nated or were found not to exist; (2) several of the practices had already been dealt
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reasons. For example, on one occasion the USTR cited a pending
countervailing duty proceeding where the Department of Commerce
was already investigating the allegations made in the section 301 peti-
tion case133 as his justification for terminating the investigation.1
34
The USTR concluded that the termination was necessary "as a matter
of policy to avoid redundant remedies and the waste of limited govern-
ment resources .... "135
In another determination, the USTR discontinued an investiga-
tion into allegations that the EEC and Japan had engaged in an unfair
trade practice by agreeing to divert Japanese steel exports to the
United States. 136 The USTR did so on the basis of the fourth factor
discussed in the Roses case, 137 finding insufficient substantiation for
the claim that the EEC-Japan agreement unfairly burdened United
States commerce.
138
The foregoing reflects just some of the ways of disposing of sec-
tion 301 petitions at the preliminary stages. The mere filing of a peti-
tion and initiation of an investigation have at times had a sufficient in
terrorem effect that the foreign country has ceased the offending trade
practice. 139 At other times, the President has concluded that practices
which are allegedly unfair or unreasonable are neither. 4° Typically,
however, the United States and the foreign country involved enter into
bilateral negotiations that often substantially modify or remove the
offending restrictions. 14' If the negotiations fail, the President may
with in the context of countervailing duty investigations; (3) many of the allega-
tions of unfair practices were not sufficiently supported by information in the peti-
tion; and (4) the petition did not, with respect to several allegations, adequately
demonstrate the burden to U.S. commerce or the causal link between the alleged
practice and effect.
Id. The Federal Register notice added that "[w]here the decision not to initiate is based on
the latter two factors, it is without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to re-fie when
adequate information is developed." Id.
133. 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (1982).
134. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
135. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,764 (1982) (Commerce Department investigation of an alleged
Subsidies Code violation in the subway car industry by the Canadian government).
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. See 41 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1976).
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,962 (1978).
139. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (1980) (EEC subsidies on malt exports reduced one
year after the filing of a section 301 petition).
140. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 29,631 (1985) (practices of the member states of the Euro-
pean Space Agency not a violation of section 301). This section 301 action involved allega-
tions of government inducements and assistance in the commercial phase of the European
Space Agency ("ESA"). Id. Since there is no international reasonableness standard for
launch services, the President compared the ESA practices with NASA's, and concluded
that "[t]he ESA practices are not sufficiently different from those of the U.S. to be actiona-
ble under Section 301." Id.
141. See, eg., 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (1984) (petition alleged that Taiwan subsidies on rice
exports restricted U.S. commerce). In lieu of bilateral negotiations and consultations, for-
mal consultations are sometimes held under the auspices of the General Agreement on
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order the imposition of appropriate sanctions. 142 Nevertheless, polit-
ical considerations may cause the President to postpone retaliatory
action pending further negotiations. 143
With the few exceptions noted, 144 the USTR has not outright
rejected a section 301 petitioner. Yet, substantial doubts linger
whether the section 301 relief has satisfied the petitioner. 45
C. SECTION 201 ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF
In the eleven-year period from 1974 through February 1986, the
International Trade Commission instituted sixty section 201 escape
clause investigations. 146 In that time the Commission issued twenty-
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 1,504 (1979) (GATT panel report
results in discontinuance by EEC of minimum import price mechanism for canned fruit
juices); 45 Fed. Reg. 51,169 (1980) (GATT Subsidies Code dispute settlement process
pursued in connection with EEC export subsidies on wheat); see also 43 Fed. Reg. 8.876
(1978) (GATT panel appointed); 46 Fed. Reg. 1,389 (1981) (GAIT panel appointed); 49
Fed. Reg. 5,915 (1984) (GATT panel appointed).
The negotiation and consultation process can drag on interminably. For example, a peti-
tion filed October 25, 1982 see 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (1982), alleging Japanese import restric-
tions on leather footwear was finally resolved through negotiations in December 1985. See
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (1986). Similarly, resolution of a petition filed October 29,
1981, alleging that the EEC gave unlawful production subsidies to its canned fruit industry
was still pending as of November 1985. See 46 Fed. Reg. 61,358 (1981); see also 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1482 (1985).
142. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985) (U.S. imposed import duties on EEC pasta in
response to preferential EEC tariffs on Mediterranean citrus products).
143. In connection with the dispute over Mediterranean citrus imports to the EEC and
the proposed duty increase on imports of EEC pasta to the United States in retaliation,
supra note 142, President Reagan suspended the effective date of the increased duties pend-
ing further negotiations. 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1985); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (1984)
(the President postponed taking retaliatory action against Argentina for its restrictive mail
courier practices pending further negotiations); 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1421 (1985)
(Argentina's restrictive practices permanently lifted following the President's postpone-
ment of action).
144. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Coffield, supra note 47, at 384, where the author notes that prior to the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the majority of section 301 cases were never satisfactorily
resolved from the U.S. point of view. The author goes on to note:
[N]o section 301 case to date has led to retaliation by the U.S. Government against
the complained of act, practice, or policy of the foreign government. Nor have
several of the cases been resolved successfully or even partially from the point of
view of the petitioner. Many cases with a partial action on the part of the foreign
government, were terminated because of the de minimis nature of the harm suf-
fered, or were rather unsatisfactorily resolved through the GATT dispute settle-
ment mechanism.
Id. at 399.
146. See Kennedy, Causation Under the Escape Clause: The Case For Retaining the
"Substantial Cause"Standard, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 185, 193 (1985) (noting that fifty-three
section 201 cases have been initiated by the Commission). For seven later cases, see Steel
Fork Arms, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,420 (1986) (notice of investigation), 51 Fed. Reg. 27,262 (1986)
(negative determination); Apple Juice, 51 Fed. Reg.28,448 (1986) (negative determination);
Certain Metal Castings, 51 Fed. Reg. 130 (1986) (notice of investigation), 51 Fed. Reg.
21,255 (1986) (negative determination); Electric Shavers & Parts Thereof, 50 Fed. Reg.
43,009 (1985) (notice of investigation), 51 Fed. Reg. 11,358 (1986) (negative determina-
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nine affirmative determinations, three split decisions, and twenty-three
negative determinations.1 47 After making an affirmative escape clause
determination, the Commission recommends to the President the relief
that it believes appropriate under the circumstances.1 48 Such relief
can take the form of increased duties, tariff rate quotas, 149 and quo-




The President may accept or reject in whole or in part any of the
ITC's relief recommendations, 53 as well as attempt to negotiate
orderly marketing arrangements with the country or countries
involved.1 54 Beyond the overarching consideration of U.S. national
economic interest,15 5 Congress has enumerated nine factors that the
President must consider--"in addition to such other considerations as
he may deem relevant"' 56-in determining whether to grant import
relief under section 201.157 Of the Commission's thirty-two affirma-
tive and split determinations, the President has granted some form of
import relief in eleven cases.' 5 8 Such relief may last for up to five
years. 5 9 In addition, the President may reduce or terminate the relief
at any time if he considers it in the national interest to do so.160 The
tion); Wood Shingles & Shakes, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,010 (1985) (notice of investigation), 51
Fed. Reg. 11,361 1986 (determination positive), 51 Fed. Reg. 20,953 1986 (President
imposed temporary tariffs); Nonrubber Footwear, 50 Fed. Reg. 4,278 (1985) (notice of
investigation), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (1985) (determination positive); Potassium Permanga-
nate, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,392 (1984) (notice of investigation), 50 Fed. Reg. 19,497 (1985) (neg-
ative determination).
147. See Kennedy, supra note 146, at 93.
148. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
149. The provision for tariff-rate quotas appears at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). A tariff-rate quota is a mechanism "whereby a given amount of the prod-
uct per year may enter at one tariff rate and all in excess of that amount will enter at a
higher rate." J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 202 (1969) (footnote
omitted). Such quotas should not reduce the amount of volume of the article allowed into
the United States from that which was imported in the most recent representative period.
19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (1982).
150. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d).
151. See id. §§ 2251(d)(1)(B), 2341.
152. See id. §§ 2251(d)(l)(B), 2271.
153. Id. §§ 2252(a), 2253(a).
154. Id. § 2253(a)(4).
155. Id. § 2252(a)(1)(A); see also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
156. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
157. See supra note 83.
158. See Applebaum, Section 201 (The Escape Clause), and Section 406 of the Trade Act
of 1974, in UNITED STATES IMPORT RELIEF LAWS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW
AND POLICY 137, 158 (PLI 1985).
159. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1) (1982).
160. Id. § 2253(h)(4). For an example of early termination by the President of section
201 import relief, see Proclamation No. 4904, 47 Fed. Reg. 8753 (1982) (prematurely ter-
minating, for certain segments of the mushroom industry, three-year import relief granted
to the entire mushroom industry pursuant to Proclamation No. 4801, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361
(1980)).
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following discussion examines six cases, three in which the President
granted section 201 import relief,161 and three in of which he refused
to grant such relief.
162
In a recent case, Certain Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel,1
63
the President granted industry escape clause relief to a U.S. industry.
The Commission recommended that the President impose "quantita-
tive restrictions"-the statutory euphemism for quotas. 164 Stating
that he had taken into consideration the nine factors contained in sec-
tion 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974,165 President Reagan decided to
impose the quantitative restrictions recommended by the ITC, as well
as additional tariffs.1 66 The President also directed the USTR to nego-
tiate orderly marketing arrangements with the affected countries.
1 67
Yet, the Presidential Proclamation offered no explanation for this unu-
sual import relief decision.'
68
Three months prior to the Stainless Steel case, President Reagan
ordered increased duties and a tariff-rate quota 69 following the Com-
mission's Heavyweight Motorcycles determination.1 70 The ITC recom-
mended the imposition of additional duties on imports of heavyweight
motorcycles over a five-year period beginning with a 45 percent ad
valorem duty increase the first year, declining to 10 percent in the fifth
year.' 71 President Reagan agreed with the Commission's recommen-
dation, "with tariff-rate quotas to assure small volume producers
which have not contributed to the threat of injury continued access to
the United States market.'
7 2
In the third case, Mushrooms, the Commission recommended the
161. Certain Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Proclamation No. 5074, 48 Fed. Reg.
33,233 (1983) (temporary duty increases and quantitative limitations on importation); Cer-
tain Heavyweight Motorcycles, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1983) (temporary duty increase and
tariff-rate quota on the importation); Mushrooms, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361 (1980) (increased
tariffs).
162. Nonrubber Footwear, 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (1985); Steel, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813
(1984); Copper, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609 (1984).
163. Proclamation No. 5074, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,233 (1983), modified, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,382
(1985).
164. 48 Fed. Reg. 33,233 (1983).
165. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982); see also supra note 83.
166. In accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(1), the President submitted a report to
Congress explaining why his decision differed from the recommendations of the ITC. 48
Fed. Reg. 33,233 (1983).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. 48 Fed. Reg. 6043 (1983).
170. Certain Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 161. For an explanation of tariff-
rate quotas, see supra note 149.
171. 48 Fed. Reg. 6043 (1983).
172. 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1983). The President also provided for a tariff-rate quota for
articles from Japan. Id.
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imposition of import quotas. 173 Although President Carter decided to
grant import relief, he rejected the ITC's quota recommendation, opt-
ing instead for the imposition of increased duties.17 4 The President
also created a White House task force to assist the mushroom industry
in adjusting to import competition. 7 5 In support of his decision to
substitute tariff relief for the ITC-recommended quota relief, the Presi-
dent gave the following explanation:
Increased tariffs will enable the canning industry to become more profitable
.... Tariffs are also preferable in this case because, unlike quotas, they allow
the natural market forces to continue to work, thus providing relatively more
incentive to the industry to adjust to foreign competition. Finally, tariffs are
preferred because of the difficulty of equitably allocating quotas among coun-
tries when they are highly competitive new suppliers entering a market domi-
nated by traditional suppliers.
176
No clear pattern emerges from these affirmative presidential relief
determinations. In situations where United States industries were sim-
ilarly harmed, the President responded in a seemingly ad hoc fashion.
In one case, tariffs were the only form of relief 17 7 In another determi-
nation, the President imposed both tariffs and quotas.178 Finally, as
this Article will next discuss, the President may deny all forms of
relief. 179 The most recent of the three presidential section 201 deci-
sions denying import relief is Nonrubber Footwear.180 The ITC insti-
tuted its investigation in Nonrubber Footwear'l8 after the Senate
Finance Committee passed a resolution requesting an investigation
under section 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974.182 After the Com-
mission made its recommendation for relief,1 3 the President con-
cluded that import relief would not be in the national economic
interest.18 4 The President cited the following factors in support of his
decision:
First, import relief would place a costly and unjustifiable burden on U.S.
consumers and the U.S. economy....
173. See 45 Fed. Reg. 57,221 (1980).
174. Mushrooms, supra note 161, terminated by Proclamation No. 4904, 47 Fed. Reg.
8753 (1982).
175. 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361 (1980).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See Certain Stainless Steel & Alloy Tool Steel, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,233 (1983), modi-
fied, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,382 (1985).
179. See, eg., Nonrubber Footwear, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985) (final determination).
180. Id.
181. 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (1985).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245
(1985). Section 201(b)(1) directs the Commission to promptly make an investigation upon
request of the President or the USTR, or upon receipt of a resolution of either the House
Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1).
183. 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (1985).
184. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985).
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Second, import relief would result in serious damage to U.S. trade in two
ways. If the ITC global remedy were imposed U.S. trade would stand to suffer
as much as $2.1 billion in trade damage either through compensatory tariff
reductions or retaliatory actions by foreign suppliers. This would mean a loss
of U.S. jobs and a reduction in U.S. exports. U.S. trade would also suffer
because of the adverse impact import relief would have on major foreign sup-
pliers, such as Brazil, who are heavily indebted and highly dependent on foot-
wear exports. Import relief would lessen the ability of these foreign footwear
suppliers to import goods from the United States and thus cause an additional
decline in U.S. exports.
Third, I do not believe that providing relief in this case would promote
industry adjustment to increased import competition .... I believe that the
industry has been and is in the process of successfully adjusting to increased
import competition.
185
President Reagan, in a politically courageous move, 186 denied
import relief to the domestic nonrubber footwear industry because of
the adverse effect import relief would have on U.S. export perform-
ance in other sectors of the economy.
Similarly, the second most recent escape clause determination
resulted in the President denying relief to the domestic industry. 8 7 In
Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products,188 President Reagan again
concluded that granting relief to a domestic industry that import relief
would not be in the national economic interest. 189 He gave the follow-
ing reasons for his conclusion:
1. In responding to this pressing import problem, we must do all we can
to avoid protectionism, to keep our market open to free and fair competition,
and to provide certainty of access for our trading partners.
2. It is not in the national economic interest to take actions which put at
risk thousands of jobs in steel fabricating and other consuming industries or in
the other sectors of the U.S. economy that might be affected by compensation
or retaliation measures to which our trading partners would be entitled.
3. This Administration has already taken many steps to deal with the
steel import problem. In 1982, a comprehensive arrangement restraining steel
imports from the European Community was negotiated. This Administration
has also conducted an unprecedented number of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations of steel imports, in most cases resulting in the impo-
185. Id.
186. See 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1107 (1985) (noting the hostile reception that the
President's decision in the Footwear case received):
The President's announcement prompted outrage from the industry/labor coali-
tion which brought the original Section 201 (escape clause) petition before the
ITC. Speaking for the Footwear Industries of America, George Langstaff said the
decision to do nothing "is crystal clear evidence of the bankruptcy of this Adminis-
tration's international trade policy, and a slap in the face to the U.S. Congress,
American workers, and domestic manufacturers."
Id.
187. Steel Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
188. 49 Fed. Reg. 30,807 (1984). The Commission reached an affirmative determination
as to five steel products, and a negative determination as to four steel products. Id.; see also
Kennedy, supra note 146, at 189-90.
189. 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
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sition of duties or a negotiated settlement .... 190
In an effort to defuse a politically explosive situation, the Presi-
dent went on to announce that he had decided to establish a govern-
ment policy for the steel industry to be coordinated by the USTR.191
In this case, the President focused primarily on the adverse impact
import relief would have on U.S. export industries resulting from
GATT compensation to affected countries. 192 The President recog-
nized that if the United States elected to restrict fairly traded steel
imports, 193 export trade in an unrelated sector of the economy would
be adversely affected.
Finally, the President denied section 201 import relief in
Unwrought Copper.194 In that determination, a unanimous Commis-
sion found that imports of copper were a substantial cause of serious
injury to the domestic copper mining industry.195 Despite this affirma-
tive determination, President Reagan was unreceptive to the Commis-
sion's recommendation to grant import relief,' 96 finding that such
relief would not be in the national economic interest. 97 He gave two
reasons for his conclusion: (1) the potentially adverse effect import
relief would have on the domestic copper-fabricating industry,
98
which in turn would have a backlash effect on the domestic copper
producers; and (2) the adverse effect import relief would have on the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(6) (1982). For example, under GATT if escape clause
relief is granted by the United States to a domestic industry, and if trade concession made
to the United States by other GATT signatories are nullified or impaired as a result of this
relief, then the other GAIT signatories are entitled to compensatory trade concessions.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, arts. XIX, XXIII. Article XIX provides in part:
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 1. (a) If, as a result of
unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a con-
tracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quan-
titites and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting
parties shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in
whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession....
3.(a)... [I]f such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall
then be free,... to suspend.., the application to the trade of the contracting party
taking such action... of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obliga-
tions under this Agreement ....
Id. art. XIX; see also J. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 553-73.
193. The unique feature of section 201 escape clause relief, is its focus on fairly traded
imports. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
194. 49 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (1984) (determination).
195. Id. For a discussion of this determination, see Kennedy, supra note 146, at 190-91.
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export earnings of foreign copper producers.199 The President
explained:
The imposition of import restrictions--either in the form of quotas, tariffs,
or orderly marketing agreements-would create a differential between U.S. and
world copper prices. Consequently, it would seriously disadvantage the cop-
per-fabricating industry in the United States, which employed an estimated
106,000 workers in 1983, vis-a-vis foreign competitors. Such a result would,
over time, shrink domestic demand for copper and add to the serious problems
faced by U.S. copper producers.
Import relief would also adversely affect the export earnings of the foreign
copper-producing countries, many of which are heavily indebted and highly
dependent on copper exports. It would, therefore, complicate our efforts to
maintain the stability of foreign countries to import goods from the United
States... 200
Unlike the President's Steel Import Relief Determination,
20 1
which focused on compensation to affected foreign countries and their
possible retaliation, 20 2 the President's Copper Import Relief Determi-
nation emphasized the effects on domestic fabricators of copper prod-
ucts and on the ability of less developed countries to meet their
international debt obligations.
20 3
The President's determination was a great disappointment to the
U.S. copper industry.2°4 That disappointment was expressed through
a bill introduced in the Senate shortly after the President's Unwrought
Copper determination. 205 The bill would have eliminated the Presi-
dent's discretion to withhold relief under section 201 following an
affirmative Commission determination.
Comparing these six cases, a possible explanation for the Presi-
dent's different treatment is the size of the industry in question, both
domestically and worldwide. The President is more likely to withhold
relief when a larger industry is involved. Although this conclusion
may seem counterintuitive, the larger the industry, the more substan-
tial will be the impact of any relief accorded that industry. Therefore,
it is more probable that relief will be denied to larger industries
because of the serious threat from retaliatory action or GATT com-
pensation such relief presents to unrelated sectors of the U.S.
199. Id
200. Id. President Reagan also noted that there were signs that the world price of cop-
per, which had been severely depressed, was beginning to rise. Id.
201. 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
202. See supra text accompanying note 190.
203. This concern for Third World debt obligations was also among the factors cited for
denying relief in Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 179. See supra text accompanying note
185.
204. See Copper Industry Case History Points Out Problems in Using Statute, Attorney
Says, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 243 (1986).
205. S. 2524, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Copper and Extractive Industries Fair Com-




The results of section 337, section 301 and section 201 proceed-
ings provide an excellent backdrop for analyzing the policy bases of
these statutes. These laws currently promise more relief than they
deliver. They raise unreasonable expectations on the part of domestic
parties, expectations that are all too often dashed. The source of this
failure lies in the provisions for presidential discretion.20 7 Once a
proper statutory showing of injury and causation is made, the need for
predictable mandatory relief, as well as the interest in maintaining
respect for and confidence in democratically-created dispute resolution
processes, outweighs the President's desire for flexibility in intera-
tional trade. Unfortunately, the current statutes' broad grant of presi-
dential discretionary power frustrates the policy reasons for their
existence, i.e., to provide relief to injured U.S. industries. The follow-
ing discussion suggests that eliminating presidental discretionary
authority under each of the three statutes would restore their potential
vigor.
IV. THE CASE FOR LESS DISCRETION AND
MORE PREDICTABILITY
In examining U.S. international trade legislation and possible
ways to improve it, it is necessary to keep in mind that Congress has
the power to regulate international trade under the Constitution.
20 8
Although the legal framework of international commerce should be
changed, repealing sections 337, 301, or 201 would be not only politi-
cally unwise and impractical, but would not ease the problems of U.S.
manufacturers caused by foreign imports. These statutes are critical
tools in combating foreign unfair trade practices and remedying injury
caused by foreign trade competition.
Experience has shown that these three statutes are flawed. For
example, section 301 has promised far more relief for the U.S. export-
ing community than it can deliver because of the exercise of presiden-
tial discretion.209 Although the President has disapproved section 337
determinations only four times,210 such disapproval can only create
feelings of uncertainty and loss of faith within U.S. industries for dem-
ocratic process, particularly when such disapprovals follow an admin-
istrative determination that is the product of a regularized evidentiary
and adversarial proceeding. Similarly, the disappointing experience
206. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
207. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982) (section 337 presidential discretion); id. §§ 2252,
2411 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (section 201 presidential discretion).
208. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 93.
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under the section 201 escape clause has led domestic manufacturing,
production, and exporting sectors to call for trade law reform.21'
Expectations have not been frustrated because the object and
goals of sections 337, 301 and 201 are unrealistic or conceptually
flawed. Rather, the problem lies in the legislative grant of discretion
to the President under these statutes, allowing him to deny import and
other trade relief2 12 following affirmative ITC determinations. While
today the wiser course would seem to be for Congress to amend sec-
tions 337, 301, and 201 to eliminate most, if not all, Executive Branch
discretion, the legislative history to the Trade Act of 1974 in part
explains why Congress delegated to the President discretionary
authority to grant and withhold relief under sections 337, 301, and 201
in the first place.21
3
Despite the adjudicative nature of a section 337 hearing,214 Con-
gress nevertheless delegated authority to the President to disapprove
affirmative section 337 determinations "for policy reasons. '21 5 The
Senate Finance Committee's Report on the Trade Act of 1974
explained why Congress granted the President discretionary disap-
proval authority:
[T]he President would often be able to best see the impact which the relief
ordered by the Commission may have upon the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers.
Therefore, it was deemed appropriate by the Committee to permit the
President to intervene before such determination and relief become final, when
he determines that policy reasons require it. The President's power to inter-
vene would not be for the purpose of reversing a Commission finding of a viola-
tion of section 337; such finding is determined solely by the Commission,
subject to judicial review.
216
Implicit in the Senate's evaluation of the need for presidential dis-
approval power was a distrust of the Commission's ability to evalutate
the economic and political implications of its section 337 determina-
tions. Whether such criticism of the Commission is warranted is ques-
tionable, considering the tremendous staff and resources at the ITC's
disposal. 21 7 Furthermore, the ITC Commissiohiers are called upon
211. See, e.g., New Omnibus Bill Introduced by Democrats in House, Senate, Protection-
ism Averted, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 186 (1986); see also supra text accompanying notes
204-06.
212. See supra notes 131-143 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 40.
214. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
216. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 199, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7331-32.
217. See Berg, supra note 81, at 409: "The Commission has at its disposal a sizable staff
composed of trained commodity analysts, attorneys, accountants, statisticians, economists,
and clerical personnel." Id. Moreover, in the context of antidumping and countervailing
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regularly to consider economic effects in their escape clause determi-
nations.218 The Commission has made sophisticated and complex eco-
nomic analyses in its injury determinations under the antidumping
duty and countervailing duty laws for a number of years.
219
If Congress is concerned about the international political effects
of section 337 determinations, it could amend section 337 to require
the Commission, rather than the President, to take into account the
potential political effects of a section 337 remedial order. Such deter-
minations would then be subject to judicial review and reversal if they
were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 220 The President
could voice his views to the Commission either through participation
as an intervenor or an amicus at the remedy stage of the proceeding.
In this way, Congress and the Executive Branch would have some
assurances that all of the political and economic factors they deem
important would be considered by the Commission when it frames a
remedial order. Alternatively, Congress could entirely eliminate polit-
ical considerations in section 337. Section 337 proceedings could be
modeled after countervailing duty or antidumping duty proceedings,
which do not impose a statutory requirement to consider foreign
affairs concerns. Indeed, it would be logical to take foreign affairs into
account in countervailing duty cases because unlike section 337, which
involves private parties, countervailing duty proceedings focus on the
trade practices of our foreign trading partners. Addressing the trade
practices of foreign countries implicates extremely delicate foreign
affairs matters. Yet the countervailing and antidumping duty laws do
not mandate agency consideration of foreign relations concerns, nor
do they grant any discretionary power to the President like that found
in section 337.221
By shifting to the ITC the responsibility of weighing political con-
siderations, and allowing the President to be part of the calculus, the
Executive Branch would not only be assured that its views had been
heard, but the quasi-judicial nature of section 337 proceedings at the
duty suspension agreements, the Commerce Department is authorized to enter into such
settlements if doing so is "in the public interest." See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673c(d)(1)(A),
1671c(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). If the Commerce Department can be entrusted by
Congress with power to settle and resolve such sensitive international trade matters, why
not the ITC as well?
218. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
219. See Note, An Analysis of "Material Injury" Under the 1979 Trade Agreements Act,
4 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87 (1981); Note, Injury Determinations Under United
States Antidumping Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1076 (1981).
220. See Adminstrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982 & Supp. III
1985) ("The reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.").
221. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
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administrative level would be preserved. 222 Respect for and trust in
section 337 proceedings would improve with the removal of the Presi-
dent's disapproval "wild card". It is indeed anomolous that after a
full evidentiary hearing that satisfies due process requirements, 223 and
where the issues are heard in a trial-like setting,224 the President can
unilaterally set aside the results of the proceeding. 225 Although the
President cannot reverse affirmative section 337 determinations on the
merits,226 it is a legal fiction to say that presidential disapproval does
not affect the validity of the Commission's determination. 227 Disap-
proval may not render the ITC's determination void. Nevertheless,
disapproval does render those determinations of "no force or
effect."'228 In legal contemplation it is difficult to discern a difference.
Although the President has disapproved ITC section 337 determina-
tions only four times,229 it is cold comfort to U.S. firms that have suc-
cessfully prosecuted section 337 actions only to have victory snatched
away "for policy reasons." Such practices can only have an insidious
effect on respect for democratically sanctioned administrative
processes.
By comparison, section 201 escape clause proceedings are not
adversarial; 230 any interested party is free to submit information to the
Commission. 231 Neither the rules of evidence nor the rules of proce-
dure are applicable.232 Moreover, under the present statutory scheme,
there is no provision for judicial review, probably owing in large mea-
sure to the comparatively informal and advisory nature of escape
clause cases. 233 In a section 201 case, the ITC makes recommenda-
tions, not determinations, to the President on import relief. Based on
these recommendations, the President has granted import relief in
222. Administrative prcceedings are subject to judicial review. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The exercise of presidential disapproval authority, however, is
insulated from judicial scrutiny. See Duracell v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
223. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1579-80.
226. See id. at 1581-82; Young Engineers, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also supra note 216 and accompanying text.
227. See, eg., Young Engineers, 721 F.2d at 1313.
228. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The fact that presidential disap-
proval renders an ITC determination "of no force or effect" rather than void becomes
important when the scope of the ITC's remedy has motivated the disapproval. In such a
case, the Commission could amend its order to accommodate the reservations of the Presi-
dent without being put to the burden of conducting a new hearing on the merits. See
Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
229. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
230. See Berg, supra note 81, at 409.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 410.
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only eleven of the thirty-two affirmative and split Commission escape
clause determinations. 234 Under section 201, Congress has retained
the power to override any decision by the President,2 35 but Congress
has never exercised this prerogative.
Despite the procedural differences between section 337 and sec-
tion 201 proceedings, a sound argument also can be made for eliminat-
ing Executive Branch discretion in section 201 cases and vesting the
ITC with sole responsibility for import relief decisions.
The escape clause's purpose is to provide temporary relief to an
industry so that it can adjust to international competition.236 This
purpose lessens the need for political considerations because section
201 proceedings are case-specific and temporary.2 37 Moreover, section
201(b)(6) further reduces the likelihood that political considerations
would come into play.238 Section 201(b)(6) instructs the ITC to notify
the appropriate agency if it believes the case should be considered
under the antidumping or countervailing laws or unfair import prac-
tices statutes. 239 This requirement is "to assure that the United States
will not needlessly invoke the escape-clause.., and will not become
involved in... inviting retaliation in situations where the appropriate
remedy may be action under one or more United States laws against
unfair competition." 24 Consequently, the cases that fall under section
201 are less likely to entail complex international political consid-
erations.
The statute's structure also supports the argument that Congress
did not intend political considerations to figure into section 201 pro-
ceedings. According to section 201(b)(2), "the Commission shall take
into account all economic factors it considers relevant." 241 The stat-
234. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. By comparison, there have been only
four section 337 presidential approvals out of fifty-one affirmative section 337 determina-
tions. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
235. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (Supp. III 1985).
236. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7211, 7263.
237. The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 10,710 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1974) (Statement of William D. Eberle, Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of the President). In defending the
import relief portions of the Act, Mr. Eberle stated:
In other countries, if they respond by an automatic quota it can react against all of
our other exports. Whereas if we have this product-by-product approach, we do
not risk that kind of reaction against the United States. That is why we think we
can solve the same problem when there is injury without having our other
exports-12 percent of our productive capacity-attacked and precluded from the
world markets. It is a two-way street.
Id.
238. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(6) (1982).
239. Id.
240. H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1973).
241. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ute mandates no consideration of political factors; indeed, the Presi-
dent is only authorized to deny section 201 relief if to do so is "in the
national economic interest of the United States."2 42 Congress could
not have intended the President to make his determination based on
political considerations when the ITC's recommendation, which
should be the major factor in his decision, is based solely on economic
factors. Furthermore, Congress intended the Commission's recom-
mendation to clearly identify the factors on which it is based so as to
provide adequate guidance to the President.2 43 Because Congress has
not given the President explicit power to consider political factors in
the determinations, it is logical to conclude that the President should
base his decision on the same economic factors that the Commission
could have considered. 244
Congress's intent to exclude political factors from section 201
cases is further supported by the Senate Finance Committee report on
the act which stated:
[T]hat relief ought not to be denied for reasons that have nothing whatever to
do with the merits of the case as determined under U.S. law. In particular, the
Committee feels that no U.S. industry which has suffered serious injury should
be cut off from relief for foreign policy reasons.
245
This explicit statement, along with the purpose and structure of
the statute, presents a compelling argument that Congress intended
the decision-making process involved in granting escape clause relief
to be economic, not political. Thus, the "for policy reasons" ground
242. Id. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
243. H.R. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 121, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7265. The report stated that:
The Committee believes strongly that Commission determinations under this and
other statutes ought to be clear, well documented, and, as nearly as possible, deci-
sive. The Committee is disturbed by the frequency of tie votes on cases before the
Commission, particularly when not all Commissioners have voted. In all cases the
Commission should seek to reach a majority vote on the matter before it. The
effect of a "no decision" tie vote in an escape clause case is to give the President
complete discretion without much guidance about the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
244. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 124,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7268. A counter argument
exists here, however. Subsection (c), which lists a number of factors that the President
must consider before providing import relief, states that "the President shall take into
account [such enumerated factors], in addition to such other considerations as he may
deem relevant." 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c). Such language can be interpreted as giving the Presi-
dent wide discretion to consider political concerns; however, a more plausible reading, one
based on an examination of the statute as a whole, suggests that the President's considera-
tions are limited to economic factors. None of the enumerated factors encompasses polit-
ical considerations. Furthermore, in section 201(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), Congress allows the ITC to consider all "relevant" economic factors, sug-
gesting that subsequent references to "relevant considerations" are to economic factors
only.
245. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 124, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7268.
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for disapproving relief under section 337246 is not a valid basis for
denying import relief under section 201. The tenor of the Senate
Finance Committee's report is that relief should be granted ordinarily
following an affirmative ITC determination, the only question being
the form and amount of such import relief.
247
The legislative history of section 201 strongly suggest that Con-
gress intended to make section 201 escape-clause relief virtually auto-
matic following proof of injury and the requisite causal nexus. 248
Actual experience under section 201, however, does not fully match
legislative intent.249 Consequently, the decision to give the President
the power to withhold relief seems unfortunate. What Congress
intended to be a depoliticized import relief statute has developed into
one of the most politically charged trade laws.
250
The Commission is fully capable of evaluating the factors that the
President is to consider in making his escape-clause relief decisions.
251
Under such an approach, the White House could present its views as
an amicus regarding the wisdom of granting section 201 import relief
and the nature of such relief.
252
As an alternative to the foregoing proposal, the predicament in
which domestic parties find themselves could be remedied if the Presi-
dent no longer had the option of withholding section 201 relief from
injured parties. Following an affirmative section 201 determination by
the Commission, some form of relief to the affected domestic industry
should be statutorily mandated. Under such an automatic approach,
the ITC would have exclusive authority to decide whether to grant
relief.253 Once the ITC makes an affirmative section 201 determina-
tion, it would be the responsibility of the President to grant appropri-
ate and meaningful relief. Under no circumstances would withholding
section 201 relief be one of the President's options following an affirm-
ative ITC determination. Moreover, in the absence of some compel-
ling foreign affairs concern, the President should be obligated to adopt
246. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982); see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
247. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 119-25, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7263-69.
248. See supra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 146-207 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 83-88, 156-57 and accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
253. It would be naive to assume that the Commissioners, who are political appointees,
are completely neutral politically; nevertheless, the ITC is an independent federal agency
and its Commissioners are largely insulated from political pressure. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) (1982). Thus, ITC section 201 relief recommendations are likely more dispas-
sionate than the President's section 201 relief decisions.
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the relief recommended by the Commission.254
Of the three statutes under review, section 301's legal regime is
most in need of repair. This statute provides domestic exporters with
relief from unreasonable foreign import practices that restrict or bar
market access to U.S. exporters. 255 As the Senate Finance Committee
noted in its report on the Trade Act of 1974:
If diplomatic efforts and trade negotiations fail to bring about equity and reci-
procity for U.S. commerce, the acts and barriers described above should be
subject to retaliation....
Foreign trading partners should know that we are willing to do business
with them on a fair and free basis, but if they insist on maintaining unfair
advantages, swift and certain retaliation against their commerce will occur....
The authority in this section should not be used frivolously or without justifica-
tion. The Committee feels, however, that there must be a credible threat of
retaliation whenever a foreign nation treats the commerce of the United States
unfairly.
256
Experience shows that retaliation under section 301 has been any-
thing but swift, credible, or certain.257 Many section 301 cases have
dragged on interminably.258 Although the President has frequently
threatened retaliation, compromise has more often obviated the need
for such action.259 It is thus open to serious question whether section
301 in its present form is a statute with any teeth.
Section 301 could be amended to provide a more regularized,
nondiscriminatory administrative process that would afford interested
domestic parties a more predictable and certain remedy. Because the
import practices of foreign governments are at issue, responding to
domestic grievances flowing from those practices in an adversarial,
regularized administrative proceeding would pose a formidable obsta-
cle; however, it would not be insurmountable. The countervailing
254. The difficulty with this proposal lies primarily in affording interested parties with
some form of meaningful judicial review. Since section 201 proceedings are non-adversarial,
the kind of evidentiary record needed to properly apply the substantial evidence standard of
review does not exist. Nevertheless, the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion stan-
dard could be applied by a reviewing court, as is currently done in certain administrative
determinations by the Department of Commerce in antidumping and countervailing duty
cases. The factors contained in section 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1982 & Supp. III
1985), and section 202(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982), could serve as criteria for determin-
ing whether the Commission has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
255. See supra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
256. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 164, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7211, 7302-03.
257. Id.; see also Coffield, supra note 47, at 395: "To date, the United States has never
taken any final retaliatory action under section 301 against any foreign government whose
acts, practices, or policies have been the subject of a formal section 301 complaint." Id.
258. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
259. See 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (1984) (notice postponing retaliatory action against
Argentina pending further round of negotiations); Coffield, supra note 47, at 399 ("it is
important to realize that the USTR considers retaliation a tool of very last resort") (empha-
sis in original).
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duty remedy for foreign unfair trade practices provides one model of
how a statute might meet this challenge.260 Under that statute, regu-
larized administrative procedures precede assessment of counter-
vailing duties on imported merchandise illegally subsidized by a
foreign government. 261 A comparable amendment to section 301
might include presentation of evidence of allegedly unfair foreign trade
practices in an administrative hearing before the ITC. The current
section 301 practice of government-to-government consultation
62
could continue with the suspension agreement provisions of the coun-
tervailing duty law263 serving as a model, and with bilateral negotia-
tions serving as the method for informal dispute resolution.
Countervailing duty ("CVD") cases and section 301 cases, how-
ever, are not perfectly analogous. In a CVD proceeding, the articles
imported into the United States are the only subject of the CVD case
and are the target of the countervailing duties upon entry.26 In
imposing additional duties or quotas on imports from offending coun-
tries under the proposed amendments to section 301, major questions
remain as to which products to assess, length of the quota period,
amount of additional duties, and the level of quotas. These highly dis-
cretionary matters entail politically sensitive resolutions. Therefore,
the President should continue to play a part in the relief stage by shap-
ing the scope and nature of that relief following an affirmative section
301 determination. Section 301 relief, however, should be mandatory
and swift.
The need for a statute such as section 301 is undeniable. It is
equally clear that from the domestic parties' viewpoint section 301 has
been a complete failure. If for no other reason than this, section 301
proceedings should be regularized and conducted in the same manner
as CVD cases. The statute should contain a mechanism for informal
settlement, followed by the mandatory imposition of retaliatory meas-
ures by the President if negotiations fail. With the added leverage of
260. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1303 provides for the
imposition of countervailing duties where export subsidies are paid by foreign governments,
and section 1671 details the administrative procedures used in imposing those duties.
261. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671f; see also Barringer & Dunn, supra note 17;
deKieffer, When, Why, and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceeding: A Complain-
ant's Perspective, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 363 (1981); Hemmendinger & Barringer,
The Defense of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 427 (1981); Note, The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979:Countervailing and Antidumping Duty Procedures, 14J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 63 (1979).
262. 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (Supp. III 1985).
263. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). This section provides that investiga-
tions may not be suspended unless the foreign country agrees to eliminate the subsidy com-
pletely or to offset completely the amount of the net subsidy or ceases exports to the United
States within six months. Id. § 1671c(b).
264. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
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mandatory relief, petitioners and recalcitrant foreign countries might
take section 301 more seriously. The President would still have the
discretion to decide the nature of the retaliatory measures. However,
the measures would be mandatory if a settlement were not reached,
and the President would no longer have the option of denying relief.
In summary, considerations of administrative efficiency might
favor giving the ITC the ultimate and exclusive responsibility for
deciding whether to grant relief under sections 337, 301, and 201. The
Commission, however, does have some problems in resolving the myr-
iad political and foreign affairs issues inherent in all three statutes.
First, the six Commissioners, as members of an independent fed-
eral agency, are insulated from outside political pressures. Conse-
quently, the Commissioners are neither politically accountable nor
accessible through diplomatic channels.
Second, although foreign affairs is not the exclusive province of
the Executive Branch,265 one must seriously question whether the deli-
cate balancing required in foreign affairs should be entrusted to an
independent federal agency.
As an alternative to granting the ITC the authority to resolve the
political and foreign affairs issues raised in section 337, 301, and 201
proceedings, Congress could eliminate all such considerations from
those statutes to the extent that such considerations affect the decision
to grant or deny relief. Thus, if the Commission were designated as
the factfinding and adjudicative body under sections 337, 301, and
201, and if it found that a petitioner was entitled to relief under any of
those statutes, without regard to political or foreign affairs factors,
Congress could then direct the White House to grant relief or impose
sanctions. Discretion would be reserved solely to structure, not with-
hold, relief. This alternative best accommodates the competing need
for certain and predictable relief, on the one hand, and for flexible
foreign policy responses, on the other.
V. CONCLUSION
Sections 337, 301, and 201 are indispensable parts of a compre-
hensive U.S. scheme regarding domestic and international trade legis-
lation. The statutes protect U.S. manufacturers, producers, and
exporters from injurious foreign imports and from unfair foreign trade
practices. Their effectiveness has been substantially limited, however,
by the President's discretion to withhold relief under sections 301 and
201, and to disapprove the ITC's section 337 determinations. Domes-
tic firms have become increasingly disenchanted with these laws
265. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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because of the unpredictable results of presidential discretion. As for-
eign parties easily flout the rules of foreign trade without retribution,
sections 337 and 301 have become less attractive to U.S. industry as
viable forms of legal redress.
For sections 337, 301, and 201 to remain effective legal remedies
for injurious foreign trade and foreign trade practices, Congress must
make the outcome of these statutes predictable. Sections 337, 301, and
201 must bite hard. By limiting presidential discretion under each
law, by making relief mandatory upon the requisite statutory showing,
by regularizing the administrative process under section 301 using the
CVD law as a model, and by providing for judicial review under all
three statutes, Congress can put teeth and predictability into section
337, 301, and 201. Less presidential discretion will restore credibility
in the statutes, make them potent tools for ensuring free and fair trade,
and restore confidence in democratically-created adjudicative
processes.

